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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MICHAEL LYNNE RAY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45604
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR42-17-6722

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Subsequent to his guilty plea to the crime of possession of a controlled substance,
Mr. Ray was sentenced by the district court to the maximum penalty possible, a seven-year fixed
term, consecutive to a lengthy Minidoka County case, despite the prosecution’s recommendation
of a seven-year term, with three years fixed. Mr. Ray appeals his sentence on the grounds that it
was excessive and longer than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 6, 2017, police officers responded to a late evening caller reporting that a male
had come into his yard, used the garden hose to drink water, and was screaming and talking to
himself. (R., p.8.) Upon arrival, police noticed Mr. Ray laying on his shirt on his belly under a
tree, sweating profusely. He appeared to be in some distress, and was “rambling,” and after
questioning Mr. Ray regarding weapons and conducting a pat search, officers discovered he
possessed two knives, and a smoking device containing traces of methamphetamine. Mr. Ray
was arrested for this conduct as well as an outstanding parole warrant, and taken into custody.
(R., pp.8-9; Presentence Investigation (“PSI”), p.5.)
Mr. Ray waived his preliminary hearing and was charged with possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.44-48.) A persistent violator
enhancement was also filed, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., p.50.) Mr. Ray executed a Guilty
Plea Advisory Form, and entered a plea of guilty to the possession of a controlled substance
charge. (R., p.57.) As part of his plea, Mr. Ray waived his right to appeal his judgment of
conviction and his sentence so long as the district court did not exceed the prosecution’s
recommended sentence. (R., p.59; Tr.1, p. 13, ls.2-7.1) Mr. Ray suffers from a mental condition,
and as part of the presentence process, the court ordered a complete mental health evaluation.
(R., pp.55, 58.)
At the sentencing hearing, in recognition of Mr. Ray’s parole status and prior criminal
history, defense counsel argued for a two year sentence, requesting the court to make a
recommendation allowing Mr. Ray’s participation at a work center so that he could pay his fines,
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There are two transcripts in the record. The September 21, 2017, transcript will be referred to
as “Tr. 1,” whereas the sentencing transcript from November 6, 2017, will be referred to as
“Tr. 2.”
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fees, and child support. (Tr. 2, pp.6-8.) The State highlighted Mr. Ray’s criminal history, and
argued for a seven-year term, with four years fixed, to be served consecutive to his Minidoka
County cases, for which Mr. Ray was serving an approximate fourteen-year indeterminate term.
(Tr. 2, p.9, Ln.23 – p.11, Ln.3.) The district court, aware that Mr. Ray’s Minidoka County case
would factor into any sentencing, sentenced Mr. Ray to the maximum - seven-years fixed, to be
served consecutively. (Tr. 2, p.13, Ln.17 – p.16, Ln.25.) Mr. Ray then filed a timely appeal.
(R., p.81.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven years fixed
upon Mr. Ray following his conviction for possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Seven Year Fixed Sentence Upon
Mr. Ray Following His Conviction For Possession Of A Controlled Substance.
Mr. Ray asserts that, given any view of the facts, his seven year fixed sentence for
possession of trace amounts of methamphetamine is excessive. Where a defendant contends that
the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ray does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
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Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Ray must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. The

governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment considered by a sentencing court include:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). In this case, Mr. Ray’s sentence is unreasonable and
excessive because the district court failed to properly balance the numerous mitigating factors
and fashion a sentence that would fulfill the goals of sentencing, taking into consideration
Mr. Ray’s special mental health needs. The mitigating factors in Mr. Ray’s case included his
acceptance of responsibility, mental condition, severe drug addiction, and amenability to
treatment.
First, Mr. Ray entered a plea to the crime at the first available opportunity, once his
counsel received and reviewed the discovery. (R., pp.12, 54.) Mr. Ray, in light of his prior
record, realistically asked for imposed time with indeterminate time “so that way maybe I could
get into a work program, CWC, because I have an extended amount of debt due to my history
with the Department of Correction, as well as child support, fines, court costs, as well as other
things.” (Tr. 2, p.12, Ls.12-17.) This early acceptance of responsibility is mitigating. See
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982).

Moreover, acknowledgment of guilt and

acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). Mr. Ray should be afforded credit for
resolving his case prior to trial, and accepting culpability for his actions. Mr. Ray’s personal
circumstances were also mitigating.
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Mr. Ray has been severely affected by his family of origin and the trauma he suffered in
childhood. Mr. Ray’s mother was only fifteen years old when he was born, and she was illequipped. (PSI, p.66.) At times he lived with relatives and tragically, he was sexually abused by
a 17 year old babysitter and raped at age 5 by his grandmother’s boyfriend. (PSI, p.18.) He was
estranged from his father and did not get along with all of his step-siblings. It is not surprising
that due to this trauma and instability, he began to act out early in school. Mr. Ray tried to kill
himself in 1986 when he was only 12. (PSI, p.23.) He was diagnosed with adjustment reaction,
PTSD, ADHD, and placed on Ritalin. (PSI, p.24.) Mr. Ray’s victimization was not his fault; he
was a mere child. But unfortunately, it contributed to the debilitating mental condition he suffers
in his adult life. Mr. Ray would try to kill himself at least two more times, at age 42 and age 43
(the last incident occurring in 2017). (PSI, pp.32, 50.) These struggles with mental health and
substance abuse continued to plague him. In March of 2012, he was evaluated and given a
diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Psychotic Disorder NOS and Amphetamine
Dependence. Individual counseling was recommended, substance abuse treatment and
medication management. (PSI, p.24.) The diagnosis and recommendations suggested the need
for a uniquely tailored treatment plan, but there is no evidence that Mr. Ray received the same.
He was admitted to Canyon View Behavioral Health for treatment in 2016 and 2017 after
experiencing visual and auditory hallucinations with suicidal ideation. These symptoms had
occurred independent of any illicit drug use. His diagnosis in 2016 included schizoaffective
disorder, depressed; methamphetamine abuse; and rule-out antisocial personality disorder. He
was placed on several medications, including Abilify, Fluoxetine, Levothyroxine, and
Pravastatin. (PSI, p.30.)
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This trauma explains much of Mr. Ray’s criminal conduct, because it has played an
integral role in his addiction. See State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993)
(mitigating facts included defendant’s young age, lack of high school completion, abusive
childhood having lived in “numerous broken homes,” and “was introduced to drugs and alcohol
at a very young age and admit[ted] to being chemically dependent.”). Mr. Ray’s criminal history
was reflected in the PSI. It is noteworthy that he was treated exceptionally harsh given his first
felony convictions related to conduct committed when he was under age, where he was waived
into adult court. (PSI, p.9.) At that time, he had several juvenile adjudications, mainly for theft
and school related misconduct. At the same time, his current crime, possession of trace amounts
of methamphetamine, is not a violent nor serious crime. Similar to the defendant in Gonzales,
Mr. Ray faced significant trauma and hardship due to his childhood and mental health,
eventually turning to alcohol and drugs to alleviate his pain. Courts have recognized that
substance abuse can be a mitigating factor in sentencing. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d
323 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91.
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol
resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating
circumstance.

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981).

Despite his substance abuse

challenges, Mr. Ray realizes that he has a severe addiction and mental health issues, and is
amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. (PSI, pp.6, 27.) At sentencing, Mr. Ray explained his
plan to get back on medication, potentially returning to the Victory Home program, which would
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allow him the opportunity to get back to work and fulfill his financial obligations. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.4-9; PSI, p.19.)
It is noteworthy that the report relied upon by the court at sentencing, the PSI, at times
highlighted irrelevant, stale information, paying little heed to prosocial and positive factors. It
appears to contain very detailed infractions which have no bearing on the appropriate sentence
for a 2017 felony drug possession charge, other than to paint Mr. Ray as a lifelong deviant. For
example, it includes damning information such as Mr. Ray’s juvenile defiance in school towards
adult male teachers and a failure to wear a helmet in 1989 when he was only 15 years old.
Meanwhile, there are no recent documents, other than Mr. Ray’s self-report, which demonstrate
the damaging effect of the sexual assaults, lack of parental support and male role model, and
childhood instability. (PSI, pp.17-19.) Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32 (“I.C.R. 32”), a PSI
may contain reliable hearsay information, including “any prior record” of a defendant. It is hard
to imagine how not wearing a helmet at age 15 assisted this criminal court, 29 years later, in
fashioning an appropriate sentence, or how dismissed charges alone is relevant and proper. See
I.C.R. 32(b)(2) and (e)(2) (“The sentencing judge may consider information in a presentence
report regarding a previous charge against the defendant that was later dismissed after a
successful probation period.”). (emphasis added). Mr. Ray contends this Court should disregard
such information in its entirety. Notwithstanding, there remained significant mitigation evidence
before the trial court at sentencing, which the court failed to fully consider.
Because Mr. Ray’s mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing, the trial court
was required to consider the following factors when fashioning an appropriate sentence:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
The availability of treatment and level of care required;
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(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at
large, or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the
offense charged.
I.C. §19-2523; see also Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). While the court need not
recite each of the aforementioned factors on the record, it must nonetheless adequately consider
the substance of the factors in arriving at its decision. State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461
(2002). Despite this mandate, it is clear the trial court here did not sufficiently, if at all, consider
Mr. Ray’s mental health at sentencing or address each of these factors, because the trial court did
not even mention it. (Tr., generally.) Moreover, during its pronouncement of sentence, the court
clearly exaggerated the severity of Mr. Ray’s criminal conduct, and misstated his prior access to
treatment programs, meanwhile completely discounting any mental health condition. This was
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The court stated, in part:
Mr. Ray, I’ve been involved with the criminal justice system in one capacity,
either as a lawyer, a defense attorney, a prosecutor, or as a judge for 40 years. I
don’t recall I’ve ever seen a record like this, that’s just so -- I mean there’s not
anything major that pops out. I mean there are no homicides here, there are no
rapes, pillaging and plundering here, but just constant for 27 years. . . .
But more important than that was the pattern that I see of your getting paroled,
and then within a few weeks or months back in without, you know, just constant
rotating in and out, in and out, and in and out. Now, I think the fact that you’re –
you’ve not had any serious violent crimes or anything like that is probably the
reason that they bring you out for parole fairly regularly. But it’s just the pattern
of release on parole, revoke parole, release on patrol, revoke parole, new criminal
charge. In addition to that, you’ve -- I don’t think I’ve ever seen anybody who has
had the benefit of more felony sentences with one-year determinate sentences.
Just case after case, after case.
(Tr. 2, p.13, Ls.17-24, p.14, Ls.6-21 (emphasis added).) When Mr. Ray politely attempted to
explain that some of the treatment program availability had declined, the court challenged him,
stating in part:
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Well, I beg to differ. I’ve been working hand-in-hand, along with Judge Stoker,
with the Department of Corrections for years -- . . . -- on what kind of programs
they are providing, and my review is that they’re providing better programs and
more available programs over the years. And they may not be giving them to you
because you have been abusing them. But I’m talking about you’ve been given
every latitude there is, and I think you’re getting used to latitude.
(Tr. p.15, Ls.5-16.) This statement by the court evidences the court’s lack of acknowledgement
that Mr. Ray had a dual diagnosis of not only substance abuse, but significant mental illness,
summarily dismissing his previous attempts at treatment, without regard to whether they were
actually tailored to meet his needs, as abuse of the system.
Given Mr. Ray’s personal circumstances, remorse, willingness to do treatment, substance
abuse, mental health, and simultaneous obligation to Minidoka County, the trial court’s
imposition of the maximum sentence, to be served consecutive to his Minidoka case, when his
current crime was related to substance abuse and/or mental health breakdown, was absolutely
unreasonable. The sentence clearly did not reflect any consideration for Mr. Ray’s mental health
as required by law, much less the totality of the circumstances, and as such, his sentence was a
clear abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ray respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
MICHAEL LYNN RAY
INMATE #30956
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
JON J SHINDURLING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

________/s/_________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
LEA/eas
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